In our opinion, the Foundations of Cryptography are the paradigms, approaches and techniques used to conceptualize, de ne and provide solutions to natural cryptographic problems. We survey some of these paradigms, approaches and techniques as well as some of the fundamental results obtained using them. Special e ort is made in attempt to dissolve common misconceptions regarding these paradigms and results.
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It is possible to build a cabin with no foundations, but not a lasting building.
Eng. Isidor Goldreich (1906{1995)
Cryptography is concerned with the construction of schemes which are robust against malicious attempts to make these schemes deviate from their prescribed functionality. Given a desired functionality, a cryptographer should design a scheme which not only satis es the desired functionality under \normal operation", but also maintains this functionality in face of adversarial attempts which are devised after the cryptographer has completed his/her work. The fact that an adversary will devise its attack after the scheme has been speci ed makes the design of such schemes very hard. In particular, the adversary will try to take actions other than the ones the designer had envisioned. Thus, our approach is that it makes little sense to make assumptions regarding the speci c strategy that the adversary may use. The only assumptions which can be justi ed refer to the computational abilities of the adversary. Furthermore, it is our opinion that the design of cryptographic systems has to be based on rm foundations; whereas ad-hoc approaches and heuristics are a very dangerous way to go. A heuristic may make sense when the designer has a very good idea about the environment in which a scheme is to operate, yet a cryptographic scheme has to operate in a maliciously selected environment which typically transcends the designer's view.
Providing rm foundations to Cryptography has been a major research direction in the last two decades. Indeed, the pioneering paper of Di e and Hellman 8] should be considered the initiator of this direction. Two major (interleaved) activities have been:
1. De nitional Activity: The identi cation, conceptualization and rigorous de nition of cryptographic tasks which capture natural security concerns; and 2. Constructive Activity: The study and design of cryptographic schemes satisfying de nitions as in (1). should an encryption scheme which leaks the rst bit of the plaintext be considered secure? Clearly, the answer is negative and so some naive conceptions regarding secure encryption (e.g., \a scheme is secure if it is infeasible to obtain the plaintext from the ciphertext when not given the decryption key") turn out to be unsatisfactory. The lesson is that even when a natural concern (e.g., \secure communication over insecure channels") has been identi ed, work still needs to be done towards a satisfactory (rigorous) de nition of the underlying concept. The de nitional activity also undertook the treatment of unforgeable signature schemes 19]: One result of the treatment was the refutation of a \folklore theorem" (attributed to Ron Rivest) by which \a signature scheme that is robust against chosen message attack cannot have a proof of security". The lesson here is that unclear/unsound formulations (i.e., those underlying the above folklore paradox) lead to false conclusions. Another existing concept which was re-examined is the then-fuzzy notion of a \pseudorandom generator". Although ad-hoc \pseudorandom generators" which pass some ad-hoc statistical tests may be adequate for some statistical samplings, they are certainly inadequate for use in Cryptography: For example, sequences generated by linear congruential generators are easy to predict and endanger cryptographic applications even when not given in the clear. The alternative suggested in 7, 17, 26] is a robust notion of pseudorandom generators { such a generator produces sequences which are computationally indistinguishable from truly random sequences, and thus, can replace truly random sequences in any practical application. The approach was further extended to pseudorandom functions 13].
The de nitional activity has identi ed concepts which were not known before. One well-known example is the introduction of zero-knowledge proofs 18]. A key paradigm crystallized in making the latter de nition is the simulation paradigm: A party is said to have gained nothing from some extra information given to it if it can generate (i.e., simulate the receipt of) essentially the same information by itself (i.e., without being given this information). The simulation paradigm plays a central role in the related de nitions of secure multi-party computations as well as in di erent settings.
The de nitional activity is an on-going process. Its more recent targets have included mobile adversaries, Electronic Cash, Coercibility, Threshold Cryptography and more.
The constructive activity. As new de nitions of cryptographic tasks emerged, the rst challenge was to demonstrate that they can be achieved. Thus, the rst goal of the constructive activity is to demonstrate the plausibility of obtaining certain goals. Thus, standard assumptions such as that the RSA is hard to invert were used to construct secure public-key encryption schemes 17, 26] and unforgeable digital schemes 19]. We stress that assuming that RSA is hard to invert is di erent from assuming that RSA is a secure encryption scheme. Furthermore, plain RSA (alike any deterministic public-key encryption scheme) is not secure (as one can easily distinguish the encryption of one predetermined message from the encryption of another). Yet, RSA can be easily transformed into a secure public-key encryption scheme by using a construction which is reminiscent of a common practice (of padding the message with random noise). We stress that the resulting scheme is not merely believed to be secure but rather its security is linked to a much simpler assumption (i.e., the assumption that RSA is hard to invert). Likewise, although plain RSA signing is vulnerable to \existential forgery" (and other attacks), RSA can be transformed into a signature scheme which is unforgeable (provided RSA is hard to invert). Using the assumption that RSA is hard to invert, one can construct pseudorandom generators 7, 26], zero-knowledge proofs for any NP-statement 15], and multi-party protocols for securely computing any multi-variant function 27, 16] .
A major misconception regarding theoretical work in Cryptography stems from not distinguishing work aimed at demonstrating the plausibility of obtaining certain goals from work aimed at suggesting paradigms and/or constructions which can be used in practice. For example, the results concerning zero-knowledge proofs and multi-party protocols 15, 27, 16] mentioned above are merely claims of plausibility: What they say is that any problem of the above type (i.e., any protocol problem) can be solved in principle. This is a very valuable piece of information. Thus, if you have a speci c problem which falls into the above category then you should know that the problem is solvable in principle. However, if you need to construct a real system then you should probably construct a solution from scratch (rather than employing the above general results). Typically, some tools developed towards solving the general problem may be useful in solving the speci c problem. Thus, we distinguish three types of results:
1. Plausibility results: Here we refer to mere statements of the type \any NP-language has a zero-knowledge proof system" (cf., 15]). , and many others. Typically, it is quite easy to determine to which of the above categories a speci c technical contribution belongs. Unfortunately, the classi cation is not always stated in the paper; however, it is typically evident from the construction. We stress that all results we are aware of (and in particular all results cited here), come with an explicit construction. Furthermore, the security of the resulting construction is explicitly related to the complexity of certain intractable tasks. In contrast to some uninformed beliefs, for each of these results there is an explicit translation of concrete intractability assumptions (on which the scheme is based) into lower bounds on the amount of work required to violate the security of the resulting scheme. 1 We stress that this translation can be invoked for any value of the security parameter. Doing so determines whether a speci c construction is adequate for a speci c application under speci c reasonable intractability assumptions. In many cases the answer is in the a rmative, but in general this does depend on the speci c construction as well as on the speci c value of the security parameter and on what is reasonable to assume for this value. When we say that a result is suitable for practical applications (i.e., belongs to Type 3 above), we mean that it o ers reasonable security for reasonable values of the security parameter and reasonable assumptions.
Other activities. This brief summary is focused on the de nitional and constructive activities certain tasks (e.g., secret key exchange) are unlikely to be achieved by using a one-way function in a \black-box manner".
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